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Abstract: This essay gives an account of how traditional morality is best under-
stood and also why it is worth defending (even if some reform is needed) and how
this might be done. Traditional morality is first contrasted with supposedly more
enlightened forms of morality, such as utilitarianism and liberal Kantianism (i.e.,
autonomy-centered ethics). The focus here is on certain sacred values that are cen-
tral to traditional morality and which highlight this contrast and bring out the
attractions of traditional morality. Next, this essay explores and offers support
for the convergence thesis to which traditional morality, understood as common
morality, is committed. This thesis states that although there are diversemoral tra-
ditions, insofar as they are in good order we should expect them to converge upon
a common or universal morality, even if there remain some differences in the de-
tails. The defense of this thesis provides justification for the validity of traditional
morality as it suggests an objective basis.
Keywords: Traditional morality, sacred values, the sacred, ethical convergence
“The individual is foolish [. . . ] but the species is wise.” (Burke 2009[1782], 398)
“All fixed, fast-frozen relations, with their train of ancient and venerable prejudices and
opinions, are swept away, all new-formed ones become antiquated before they can ossify.
All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned [. . . ].” (Marx/Engels 2000[1848],
248)
1 Introduction
In this essay I want to get clear on the idea of ‘traditional morality’. More specif-
ically, I want to give an account of how it is best understood and also why it is
worth defending (even if some reform is needed) and how this might be done.
When the idea of traditional morality is mentioned in academicmoral philos-
ophy it is often as the contrast case to some supposedly more ‘enlightened’ form
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of morality that is said to supersede it. For instance, the utilitarian Peter Singer
writes:
“The traditional ethic is still defendedbybishops and conservative bioethicistswho speak in
reverent tones about the intrinsic value of all human life, irrespective of its nature or quality.
But, like the new clothesworn by the emperor, these solemnphrases seem true and substan-
tial only while we are intimidated into uncritically accepting that all human life has some
special dignity or worth.” (Singer 1995, 4)
I think we can in fact make headway in understanding the idea of traditional
morality by considering its contrast with supposedly more enlightened forms of
morality, such as utilitarianism and liberal Kantianism (i.e., autonomy-centered
ethics). I will take this up in the next section, where I will also aim to show the
attractions of traditional morality in comparison to these ‘enlightened’ forms of
morality. Iwill focus especially on the importance of certain ‘sacred values’ (or ‘sa-
cred goods’) within traditional morality. Sacred values are certainly not the only
type of values within traditional morality, but they are central to it and they high-
light the difference with utilitarianism and liberal Kantianism.
We will see that the adjective ‘traditional’ in ‘traditional morality’ can be un-
derstood in twoways, which on the face of it might seem to be at odds. On the one
hand, traditionalmorality canbeunderstood as commonmorality. Tobemorepre-
cise: the adjective ‘traditional’ comes in here because it refers to a form of moral-
ity that has been common throughout human history but which has come under
threat in the modern world because of the ‘Enlightenment project’ (as Alasdair
MacIntyre calls it) of seeking to justify morality apart from any appeal to an inher-
ent moral teleology, i.e., to objective (or ‘substantive’) moral purposes to which
we must align our lives if we are to achieve our fulfillment as human beings (see
MacIntyre 2007[1981], chs. 4–6).
On the other hand, the adjective ‘traditional’ in ‘traditionalmorality’ can refer
to some particular moral tradition (i.e., a specific body of moral wisdom that has
been built up and ‘handed down’ over the generations). This has also been chal-
lenged by the ‘Enlightenment project’, which brought us moral theories such as
the various versions of utilitarianism and Kantianism that seek to offer a decision
procedure (e.g., the principle of utility, the requirement of universalization, the
veil of ignorance, etc.) that prescinds from ordinary moral experience and from
anyparticular tradition-informedmoral community (whatHegel calls Sittlichkeit).
Traditional morality can then refer to commonmorality or a particular moral
tradition. Are these at odds? I want to argue that they are not, and indeed any
adequate form of traditional morality needs to incorporate both of these under-
standings. In short, the claim is that we must always access the universal via the
particular. Traditional morality, as understood here, is thus committed to a con-
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vergence thesis: this states that although there are diversemoral traditions, insofar
as they are in good order we should expect them to converge upon a common or
universal morality, even if there remain some differences in the details. This the-
sis also provides justification for the validity of traditional morality as it suggests
an objective basis. I will seek to offer support for this thesis in the third and final
section.
2 ‘Traditional’ vs. ‘Enlightened’ Moralities
Let us begin to build up a picture of traditional morality by considering its con-
trast with supposedly more enlightened forms of ethics, viz., utilitarianism and
liberal Kantianism (i.e., autonomy-centered ethics). Stuart Hampshire brings out
well the contrast between utilitarianism and traditional (i.e., common) morality
in the following passage:
“[There] is one feature of familiarmoralities which utilitarian ethics famously repudiates, or
at least makes little of. There are a number of differentmoral prohibitions, apparent barriers
to action, which a man acknowledges and which he thinks of as more or less insurmount-
able [. . . ]. [In] addition to certain fairly specific types of killing, certain fairly specific types
of sexual promiscuity, certain takings of property, there are also types of disloyalty and of
cowardice, particularly disloyalty to friends, which are very generally, almost universally,
forbidden and forbidden absolutely. They are forbidden as being intrinsically disgraceful
and unworthy, and as being, just for these reasons, ruled out: ruled out because they would
be disgusting, or disgraceful, or shameful, or brutal, or inhuman, or base, or an outrage.”
(Hampshire 1983, 87–89)
In other words, for the utilitarian there is literally ‘nothing sacred’. There are no
actions that are absolutely ruled out; anything is permissible so long as it serves
tomaximize pleasure or preference-satisfaction andminimize pain or dissatisfac-
tion.
This is made abundantly clear in the work of Peter Singer, who, e.g., is will-
ing to countenance the intentional killing ofwhat he calls “defective infants”, pro-
vided a quality of life assessment determines that their lives are not “worth living”
(see Singer 1993, chs. 4–7).¹ As we saw above, he regards those who “speak in rev-
erent tones about the intrinsic value of all human life” and thus believe that we
should never intentionally kill innocent human beings as being essentially super-
1 The language of ‘defective infants’ was used in the first edition of Singer’s Practical Ethics, but
he switched to speaking about ‘disabled infants’ in the second edition. Formore on this, see Laing
1997.
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stitious and irrational. Singer realizes that his claims are likely to be shocking to
many, but he thinks that is no reason to reject themsincehebelieveshis position is
ultimately the more rational and humane one. However, it is highly questionable
whether a view that can countenance the intentional killing of ‘defective infants’
and a host of other forms of human killing in the name of ‘quality of life’ or the
‘greatest happiness for the greater number’ is really to be considered the more
humane position. It fails to appreciate how deep the experience of the ‘special
dignity’ or sanctity of all human life goes in defining or ‘building up’ a common
moralized conception of humanity.²
This is particularly true in cultures with exemplars of saintly love, where, as
Raimond Gaita discusses, “there has developed a language of love whose gram-
mar has transformed our understanding of what it is for a human being to be a
unique kind of limit to our will” (Gaita 1998, 24). Our eyes are opened here (and
in other ways)³ to the sacredness or special dignity of all human life, which often
involves a sense of mystery. As Cora Diamond puts it:
“The sense of mystery surrounding our lives, the feeling of solidarity in mysterious origin
and uncertain fate: this binds us to each other, and the binding meant includes the dead
and the unborn, and those who bear on their faces ‘a look of blank idiocy’, those who lack
all power of speech, those behind whose vacant eyes there lurks a ‘soul in mute eclipse’.”
(Diamond 1991, 55)⁴
This sense of mystery or sacredness or special dignity surrounding human life of-
ten stands behind the expectation of care for the young, the old, and the disabled,
and of proper treatment of the dead, and the prohibition of killing innocent hu-
man beings (no matter their age or ability).
If there really is something here to which we should be responsive, then the
failure to be properly responsive has to be attributed to a lack of a proper ethical
2 In regard to ‘building up’ a moralized view of humanity, Cora Diamond writes (contra Singer):
“[It] is not out of respect for the interests of beings of the class to which we belong that we give
names to each other, or that we treat human sexuality or birth or death as we do, marking them—
in their variousways—as significant or serious. And again, it is not respect for our interests which
is involved in our not eating each other. These are all things that go to determine what sort of
concept ‘human being’ is. [. . . ] The ways in which we mark what human life is belong to the
source of moral life.” (Diamond 1978, 469–471)
3 Cora Diamond, e.g., appeals to works of literature, such as the novels of Dickens and Dosto-
evsky, in order to imaginatively bring into view the special value of humanity (see Diamond 1991,
42–59).
4 JosephConrad speaksof “the solidarity inmysterious origin, in toil, in joy, inhope, inuncertain
fate, which binds men to each other and all mankind to the visible world” (quoted in Diamond
1991, 50).
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formation that would open our eyes to this domain of the sacred (I will later return
to discuss this issue of ethical formation further), and/or to ideological and/or
moral corruption that causes a kind of moral blinding. Gaita suggests something
like the latter with regard to “those practical philosophers”—and he surely has
Singer inmind here—“who have been in the forefront of the argument to relax the
conditions under which it is permissible to kill people”: they have “no sense of
awe in the face of the questions they have raised, and no sense of humility in the
face of the traditions they condescendingly dismiss. They are aggressivelywithout
a sense of mystery.” (Gaita 1991, 322)
Although Hampshire does not use the language of the sacred, I believe some-
thing like a sense of sacred value is behind his remarks about outrage, brutality,
and inhumanity, and he does remark that “these ideas have often been associ-
ated with impiety” (Hampshire 1983, 89).⁵ As it pertains to traditional morality,
sacred value is that which is reverence-worthy and which places strong norma-
tive demands upon us for attitudes and actions that are appropriately responsive
to this reverence-worthiness. Particularly important are demands of inviolability,
and where sacred value is violated, we righty feel deep horror and outrage.⁶ So
the contention here is that a sense of sacred value is often implicit in the common
experience of horror at various forms of human killing, and the explicit articu-
lation of it is needed to make adequate sense of the wrong of these horrors. In
other words, the wrong of intentionally killing innocent human beings cannot be
explained merely in terms of ‘robbing’ someone of future enjoyable experiences
or its threat to social order or even its violation of autonomy; the horror is at the
5 On this theme, see Diamond’s ‘The Problem of Impiety’ (Forthcoming).
6 This account contrasts with Jonathan Haidt’s view of sanctity, which is one of his five moral
foundations (the others are care, fairness, loyalty, and authority) andwhichhe interprets in terms
of a visceral disgust response that has an evolutionary backstory involving “the need to avoid
pathogens, parasites, and other threats that spread by physical touch or proximity” (Haidt 2012,
148). Haidt writes: “The Sanctity foundation makes it easy for us to regard some things as ‘un-
touchable’, both in a bad way (because something is so dirty or polluted we want to stay away)
and in a good way (because something is so hallowed, so sacred, that we want to protect it from
desecration). If we had no sense of disgust, I believe we would also have no sense of the sacred.”
(149) He later writes of this sense of disgust: “It makes it possible for people to invest objects with
irrational and extreme values [. . . ] which are important for binding groups together.” (154) This
view neglects the perception of reverence-worthiness that is central to my account of sacred val-
ues. Although Haidt thinks that a sense of the sacred has a social usefulness (and it would fit
with an appeal to common human needs as a way of justifying traditional morality; see the next
section for more on this), his reductive account of it, if accepted, would have a deflationary ef-
fect on the experience of sacred values. Cf. Friedrich Hayek’s evolutionary defense of traditional
morality in Hayek 1988.
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taking of human life itself, the sense of something sacred or profoundly precious
having been violated.
In her essay ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’, Elizabeth Anscombe remarked (at a
time when utilitarianism was dominant) that the “differences between the well-
known English writers on moral philosophy from Sidgwick to the present day are
of little importance”, because, in essence, they are all consequentialists of some
form and thus show a “corrupt mind” (Anscombe 1958, 1, 17). She writes:
“The overall similarity ismade clear if you consider that every one of the best knownEnglish
academicmoral philosophers has put out a philosophy according towhich, e.g., it is not pos-
sible to hold that it cannot be right to kill the innocent as a means to any end whatsoever
and that someone who thinks otherwise is in error. [. . . ] Now this is a significant thing: for it
means that all these philosophies are quite incompatible with the Hebrew-Christian ethic.
For it has been characteristic of that ethic to teach that there are certain things forbidden
whatever consequences threaten, such as: choosing to kill the innocent for any purpose,
however good [. . . ]. [It] would [take] a certain provinciality of mind not to see this incom-
patibility as the most important fact about these philosophers, and the differences between
them as somewhat trifling by comparison.” (9–10)
The ‘Hebrew-Christian ethic’, as Anscombe understands it, is essentially a the-
istic natural law ethic. But it is not just the Hebrew-Christian ethic that teaches
that “there are certain things forbidden whatever consequences threaten”. For in-
stance, Socrates in Plato’s Gorgias says that it is better to suffer evil than to do
evil (469c). Likewise, Aristotle remarks: “there are some thingswe cannot be com-
pelled to do. Rather than do themwe should suffer themost terrible consequences
and accept death.” (NE III.1, 1110a26–28) Hementions the act of killing one’s own
mother as such a case. Elsewhere he says:
“not every action or feeling admits of themean. For the names of someautomatically include
baseness—for instance, spite, shamelessness, envy [among feelings], and adultery, theft,
murder among actions. For all of these and similar things are called by these names because
they themselves, not their excesses or deficiencies, are base. Hence in doing these things we
can never be correct, but must invariably be in error.” (NE II.6, 1107a10–15)
The claim here (following Anscombe) is that the sense that there are some things
that are absolutely forbidden is common to ordinary moral experience, provided
one has received a proper upbringing and has not been ideologically andmorally
corrupted by bad moral theories (which is what I take Anscombe to mean in her
provocative ‘corrupt mind’ charge).⁷
7 See Gaita 1991, chs. 2 & 17 for a sympathetic discussion of Anscombe’s ‘corrupt mind’ charge.
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So far we have focused on the contrast of traditional morality with utilitar-
ianism, but what about liberal Kantianism, i.e., autonomy-centered ethics? It is
important first to note that Kant himself in fact can be read as an advocate of tradi-
tionalmorality and as trying to provide it withwhat he took to be themost rational
footing.⁸ One only need consider his traditional (or quasi-traditional) views on
homicide, suicide, stealing, lying, sexuality, etc. Although his first formulation of
the categorical imperative—the universalization requirement—may appear pro-
ceduralist (or constructivist) in a way that is at odds with the substantive moral
judgments of traditional morality, Kant’s second formulation of the categorical
imperative—the respect for persons (i.e., humanity) requirement—can be read as
appealing to a substantive moral judgment about the intrinsic dignity of human
beings in virtue of their capacity for rationality and moral agency in order to
ground his defense of traditional moral positions.
However, later Kantians have developed a weaker or more liberal version of
Kant’s idea of respect for persons, where this is interpreted primarily in terms of
respect for individual autonomy, which also requires certain proceduralist rules
of fairness. This view does contrast with utilitarianism in ruling out, e.g., many
forms of human killing, however it typically allows for some forms of human
killing—for the sake of individual autonomy—that are absolutely prohibited from
the perspective of traditional morality: e.g., abortion and physician-assisted sui-
cide.⁹Here there is a denial of the traditional doctrine of the sanctity of human life
(or the life as a sacred ‘gift’ view) according to which there is an absolute require-
ment that we ought never to kill intentionally any innocent human being¹⁰—no
matter the ability or disability or the stage of development from conception to nat-
ural death—in virtue of all human beings possessing the same profound intrinsic
dignity.¹¹
8 See the titles of the first two sections of Kant’s Groundwork for an indication of this intent. For
a more recent Kantian defense of traditional morality, see Donagan 1977.
9 On abortion, see, e.g., Thomson 1971; on physician-assisted suicide, see, e.g., Dworkin et al.
1997. For defenses of the traditional view on these matters, see, e.g., Keown 2012 and Oderberg
2000a–b.
10 Here ‘innocent’ means that one is not intentionally threatening lethal or some other grave
harm.
11 Ronald Dworkin is an interesting case of a liberal Kantian who explicitly endorses the idea of
sacred values. However, since people disagree on sacred values, he wants to privatize the alle-
giance to themand give precedence to autonomy (i.e., individual conscience) in politicalmorality
and public policy. This is of course very different from the traditional view, which would say that
any sacred value that didn’t have precedence over autonomy is not in fact a sacred value. See
Dworkin 1993, esp. 13–15, 25–26, 28, 32–34 & ch. 3 (‘What is Sacred?’); see also Dworkin 2013.
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We also see the opposition to traditional morality if we consider another
domain besides life and death where a sense of sacred value arises (which was
also mentioned by Hampshire): viz., human sexuality. On the standard (Kantian)
liberal sexual ethic there is nothing of inherent moral significance about human
sexuality and only general moral rules apply. Thus, sex can be seen as being on
parwith a business relationship inwhich each party consents to exchange a ‘com-
modity’ for mutual benefit and where they are expected to live up to their side of
the bargain (see Goldman 1977, 280–283; cf. Primoratz 2001). The liberal sexual
ethic is essentially a consent-only model of sexual ethics. On such a view there
is nothing wrong with casual sex, promiscuity, prostitution, sadomasochism,
pornography, and so forth, so long as everyone involved gives their consent. In
contrast to the liberal idea of the sexual commodity, traditional morality affirms
the idea of the sexual sacrament according to which there is something inherently
sacred or profoundly significant about human sexuality (see Scruton 1996, 134).
This can be seen, e.g., in the vow of erotic love, which is ritually expressed in
marriage vows. Roger Scruton writes:
“A vow of marriage creates an existential tie, not a set of specifiable obligations. [. . . ] [The]
world of vows is a world of sacred things, in which holy and indefeasible obligations stand
athwart our lives and command us along certain paths, whether we will or not. [. . . ] [The]
theory of marriage as a sacrament captures a prior sense that something similar is true of
erotic love.” (Scruton 2006, 88)
Unlike lust (which is common in animal life), erotic love (which is distinctively
human) involves a loving intention towards a particular human being with whom
one desires to be sexually united in an intimate bond and where the beloved is
regarded as irreplaceable. Because human beings are sacred (i.e., have special
dignity) and sexuality is an integral part of whowe are, the intimate bond of erotic
love is properly seen as a sacred bond.¹² Furthermore, erotic love has an inherent
‘nuptuality’: it tends towards permanence and exclusivity.¹³ In other words, when
12 Traditionally the link between sexuality and the generation of new life has also been seen as
imbuing human sexuality with a sense of the sacred or the profoundly significant. Consider the
following remarks by Anscombe: “There is no such thing as a casual, non-significant sexual act.
[. . . ] Those who try to make room for sex as mere casual enjoyment pay the penalty: they become
shallow. [. . . ] They dishonour their own bodies; holding cheap what is naturally connected with
the origination of human life.” (Anscombe 2008, 186) She says that the perception of dishonour
here involves a “mystical perception” (187), which I would call a sense of sacred value. Anscombe
does tend to neglect or under-emphasize that there is also profound significance in the unitive
aspect of erotic love.
13 See Scruton 1986, 339; cf. Plato: “love is wanting to possess the good forever” (Symposium
206a).
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we really love someone erotically we do not want to live without them, indeed we
want to bind our lives together, and this also demands exclusivity as proper to the
profound intimacy of the erotic loving relationship (and hence jealousy can be
an appropriate emotional response to threats to this intimate relationship). Thus,
erotic love finds its proper fulfillment in the vow of marriage.
One of themost important aspects of the traditional sexual ethic is that it aims
to ennoble and humanize sexual desire by transformingmere lust into erotic love,
which, at its best, is one of the highest modes of human experience. The tradi-
tional ethic does so through cultivating virtues such as chastity (i.e., right inten-
tion in sexual desire), fidelity, modesty, and erotic love itself. Additionally, it also
places strong taboos around certain aspects of human sexuality. For advocates of
the sexual revolution, these taboos are of course seen as repressive and unhealthy
and so to be overthrown. However, while some reform of traditional sexual mores
may be called for, insofar as one seeks to throw off all taboos regarding human
sexuality (save that against non-consensual sex), this seems to be a prime case of
‘throwing the baby out with the bathwater’. Some of these taboos—e.g., against
casual sex, promiscuity, adultery, pornography, prostitution, etc.—are meant to
protect what is best in human sexuality: viz., erotic love and its vow. Other taboos
are concerned with avoiding what is worst: viz., rape and other forms of sexual
violence.
Here we also see the importance of recognizing sacred value in human sexu-
ality. For the liberal, consent-only model of sexual ethics, rape and other forms
of sexual violence are wrong because they violate consent (i.e., individual au-
tonomy). While this is certainly true, what the standard (Kantian) liberal sexual
ethic cannot explain—due to its view that human sexuality has no inherent moral
significance—is why rape is so wrong, indeed, why it is one of the worst wrongs
that one human being can do to another, and it is certainly worse than, say, a
‘health nut’ forcing someone to eat an apple at gun point (see Scruton 1996, 133
and Benatar 2002). I think the same is true for the utilitarian view, given the exclu-
sive focus on pleasure and pain (or preference-satisfaction and -dissatisfaction).
Whatwe need is the language of the sacred (or something like it) in order to articu-
late our experience of the wrong of rape and other forms of sexual violence, since
there is rightly a sense of desecration of something sacred (i.e., reverence-worthy)
in such cases. In short, it seems thatwe need something like the traditional sexual
ethic—even if we don’t embrace everything that has fallen under that heading—
because of its strong taboos that aremeant to recognize and protect what is sacred
(or profoundly significant) in human sexuality and to prevent it from becoming a
mere object of use.
In the foregoing I have focused on some of themost contested issues between
traditional morality and supposedly more enlightened forms of morality. I have
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tried to show that traditional morality does a better job of accounting for common
moral experiences in matters of life, death, and sexuality. I have focused on cer-
tain sacred values because they are of central importance for traditional morality
and they highlight the contrastwith supposedlymore enlightened forms ofmoral-
ity and the attractions of traditional morality. However, there are other kinds of
values that are also recognized, such as noble (or admirable) values, which come
into play, e.g., with an account of virtues and vices. Traditional morality seeks to
attend to the common human fund of moral experience and conserve whatever
is good in this experience. In this way it can be seen as an anti-theory approach
to morality. This does not mean that philosophy does not have a role to play, but
its role consists primarily in overcoming inconsistencies, clarifying and articulat-
ing our inchoate sense of things, and offering justification. The sort of ‘theory’
that traditional morality is against is that which seeks to offer a decision proce-
dure (e.g., the principle of utility, the requirement of universalization, the veil of
ignorance, etc.) that prescinds from ordinary moral experience and from any par-
ticular tradition-informed moral community.
A particularly problematic feature of such moral theories is their reduction-
ism: they reduce the complexity of our ordinary moral experience, especially in
regard to substantivemoral judgments about various good andbad things that de-
fine for us the good life (see Williams 1985, 15–18). They do so by offering a basic
principle or decision-procedure that is supposed to take precedence in the moral
life. However, they do not prescind entirely from substantive moral judgments,
since accepting the precedence of their basic principle or decision-procedure re-
quires a substantivemoral judgment about, e.g., the goodness of universal benev-
olence (in the case of utilitarianism) or the importance of autonomy (in the case
of liberal Kantianism).¹⁴
Even if we grant that these are good things, why think that they are the only
good things or that they should take precedence? According to traditional moral-
ity, benevolence (or charity) is a virtue, but not the only one. There are other
virtues such as loyalty and justice with which it must be made consistent. Like-
wise, in certain respects autonomy is indeed a good, though it is also constrained
by other goods, such as virtue and the value of human life. Moreover, if there are
no ends of choice that are of great importance and can place constraints on our
choices, then this seems to deflate our sense of the importance of choice. David
Wiggins writes:
“[If] we are not ready to scrutinize with any hesitation or perplexity at all the conviction (as
passionate as it is groundless, surely, for no larger conception is available that could vali-
14 See Taylor 1989, ch. 3 (‘The Ethics of Inarticulacy’).
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date it) that everything in the world is in principle ours or there for the taking; then what
will befall us? Will a new disquiet assail our desires themselves, in a world no less denuded
of meaning by our sense of our own omnipotence than ravaged by our self-righteous insa-
tiability?” (Wiggins 2001, 242)
Thus defenders of traditional morality typically see supposedlymore enlightened
forms of morality as mere ‘fragments’ torn from the larger whole of traditional
morality. As C. S. Lewis puts it in his defense of traditional morality (or the Tao,
as he calls it):
“What purports to be new systems [of value] [. . . ] all consist of fragments from the Tao itself,
arbitrarily wrenched from their context in the whole and then swollen to madness in their
isolation, yet still owing to the Tao and to it alone such validity as they possess. [. . . ] The
rebellion of new ideologies against the Tao is a rebellion of the branches against the tree: if
the rebels could succeed theywould find that they have destroyed themselves.” (Lewis 1944,
43–44)¹⁵
3 Convergence
In discussing ‘traditionalmorality’, rather than traditionalmoralities, I have been
supposing that there is a common morality that particular moral traditions con-
verge upon insofar as they are in good order. If this were indeed the case, then it
would also provide justification for the validity of traditional morality as it sug-
gests an objective basis. Regarding this issue, Lewis writes:
“If we lump together, as I have done, the traditional moralities of East and West, the Chris-
tian, the Pagan, and the Jew, shall we not find many contradictions and some absurdities? I
admit all this. Some criticism, some removal of contradictions, even some real development,
is required. [. . . ] [The] Tao admits of development from within.” (Lewis 1944, 45)
Even though theremay be some differences between traditional moralities (hence
the use of the plural) and even if there is required some further refinement, what
is important here is what is shared in common, which are the sort of things men-
tioned by Hampshire above (e.g., absolute or near absolute prohibitions on “cer-
tain fairly specific types of killing, certain fairly specific types of sexual promiscu-
ity, certain takings of property, [and certain] types of disloyalty and of cowardice,
15 A similar ‘fragments’ (or ‘survivals’) thesis is advanced in Anscombe 1958 andMacIntyre 2007
[1981].
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particularly disloyalty to friends”, etc.), andwhich distinguish them from suppos-
edly more enlightened forms of morality.
Traditional morality relies on ‘the tried and true’. The conjunction is impor-
tant “because the tried alone may have little in its favor and much against it and
because the true needs to be tried, and tried again, to be shown to be true” (Kekes
1998, 5). Traditional morality claims that there is a body of moral wisdom (ex-
pressed in traditionally endorsed taboos, manners, and virtues) that has been
built up over the ages in cultures that are in good working order in dealing with
fundamental facets of the human condition (e.g., life, death, sexuality, procre-
ation, sociality, vulnerability, etc.). Although there might be cause to reform cer-
tain aspects of this inherited moral wisdom—as Lewis says, “the Tao admits of
development fromwithin”—it is foolish to think that we can completely discard it
and try to ‘reinvent the wheel’ in the moral life. As the first epigraph puts it: “The
individual is foolish [. . . ] but the species is wise.”
But do we have good reason to affirmwhat I have called the convergence the-
sis? Consider Bernard Williams’s challenge to this thesis. Williams thinks that in
science there can be convergence on “how things (anyway) are” but he does not
think there is a “convergence of reflective ethical thought on ethical reality in even
a distant analogy to the scientific case” (Williams 1985, 139, 152). Indeed, he thinks
that reflection tends to undermine purported claims to ethical knowledge, espe-
cially in regard to “thick ethical concepts”—e.g., sanctity, loyalty, courage, hon-
esty, kindness, cruelty, brutality, etc.—that are seen as “world-guided and action-
guiding” andare important in traditionalmorality.¹⁶This destructionof purported
ethical knowledge often occurs in traditional (or whatWilliams calls “hypertradi-
tional”) societies as they become more reflective and thus “become conscious of
ethical variation and of the kinds of explanation itmay receive” (159).What reflec-
tiveness can reveal to us, he elsewhere suggests, is the “radical contingency” of
our ethical beliefs,where they are seenas entirely dependent on the contingencies
of our personal, cultural, and evolutionary histories and so “theymight have been
different from what they are” (Williams 2002, 20). Williams writes: “This sense of
contingency can seem to be in tensionwith something that our ethical ideas them-
selves demand, a recognition of their authority.” (21)
Williams thinks that themost comprehensible attempt to provide an objective
grounding for morality is through appeal to common human needs¹⁷ (and related
desires and emotional responses); but he does not think even this is likely to be
16 On reflection destroying purported ethical knowledge, see Williams 1985, 142–148, 158–159,
163–164, 167–170, 199–200; on ‘thick ethical concepts’, see 129–130, 140–148; the quotation is at
141.
17 I take it that a ‘need’ here pertains to one’s flourishing or fulfillment.
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successful because “such considerations will radically underdetermine the ethi-
cal options even in a given social situation”:
“Any ethical life is going to contain restraints on such things as killing, injury, and lying,
but those restraints can take very different forms. Again, with respect to the virtues, [. . . ] we
only have to compare Aristotle’s catalogue of the virtues with any that might be produced
now to see how pictures of an appropriate human life may differ in spirit and in the actions
and institutions they call for. We also have the idea that there are many and various forms
of human excellence which will not all fit together into [. . . ] one harmonious whole, so any
determinate ethical outlook is going to represent some kind of specialization of human pos-
sibilities. [. . . ] The project of giving to ethical life an objective and determinate grounding
in considerations about human nature is not, in my view, very likely to succeed.” (Williams
1985, 153; cf. ch. 3)
I think Williams overplays here the extent of the underdetermination of human
nature for ethics. In response to Williams, John Cottinghamwrites: “there is good
reason to suppose that our species has remained biologically stable for manymil-
lennia. And certainly the human beings with whom Aristotle or the Buddha or Je-
sus were concerned were, in all respects relevant to biological flourishing, pretty
much identical with us.” (Cottingham 2009, 27) He acknowledges that there are of
course differences across cultures but says: “diverse cultures [are] differing vehi-
cles for the development of a common humanity, manifested in deep underlying
common needs and desires—for physical security, for protection against vulner-
ability, for the development of personal relationships, for love and affection and
family loyalty, and so on” (31). And so if we consider Aristotle’s catalogue of the
virtues it would seem, contra what Williams says in the above passage, that any-
one concerned with leading a fulfilling life would have reason to cultivate many
of these virtues: e.g., courage, moderation, generosity, friendship, etc.We can say
something similar with respect to the restraints on killing, injury, lying, etc. In-
deed, in light of our common human needs and related desires and emotional
responses, we can see why across most if not all cultures there are absolute or
near absolute prohibitions on “certain fairly specific types of killing, certain fairly
specific types of sexual promiscuity, certain takings of property”, and on certain
types of “disloyalty and of cowardice, particularly disloyalty to friends”.
Such virtues and prohibitions, I have suggested, are part of the tried and true
moral wisdom that has been built up over the ages in addressing fundamental
facets of the human condition (e.g., life, death, sexuality, procreation, sociality,
vulnerability, etc.) and they enable a well-lived life. Williams in fact on occasion
seems to acknowledge this ‘tried and true’ moral wisdom as offering themost rea-
sonable path for living a good life. At one point he writes:
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“We wish [. . . ] to bring up children to share some of these ethical, as of other cultural, con-
ceptions, and we see the process as good not just for us but for our children, both because it
is part of our conception of their well-being and also because, even bymore limited concep-
tions of happiness or contentment,wehave little reason to believe that theywill be happier if
excluded from the ethical institutions of society. Even if we know that there are some people
who are happier, by the minimal criteria, outside those institutions, we also know that they
rarely become so by being educated as outlaws. As a result of all that, we have much reason
for, and little reason against, bringing up children within the ethical world we inhabit, and
if we succeed they themselveswill see theworld from the same perspective.” (Williams 1985,
48)
So the underdetermination of human nature for ethics becomes a question of de-
gree, and the precepts of traditional morality can still be seen as a best bet for a
well-lived life.
But if we base traditional morality merely on common human needs, then
there is a further question that arises about whether this can fully make sense
of the normative authority that the precepts of traditional morality seem to pos-
sess, especially those that relate to what I have described as sacred values. For
one thing, this appears to express an instrumentalized view of such values; i.e.,
the appeal is to their usefulness in serving commonhumanneeds rather than their
inherent demandingness.¹⁸ Furthermore, given these common human needs and
relateddesires andemotional responses are the result of evolutionary andcultural
processes that could have been otherwise, wemight worry, asWilliams does, that
“[this] sense of contingency [is] in tension with something that our ethical ideas
themselves demand, a recognition of their authority”. The normative authority of
ethics, as traditionally understood, seems to carry with it a sense of necessity that
is at odds with seeing our ethical beliefs as radically contingent. For instance, we
experience it as a non-contingent fact that we ought never to kill intentionally an
innocent human being and that we ought to act with kindness rather than cruelty
towards others because of their special dignity or sacred value. In other words,
this is true in any possible world where there are human beings. To make these
precepts contingent on our common human needs and related desires and emo-
tional responses means to accept a significantly reduced conception of normative
authority. The only sort of ethical necessity that is possible here, it seems, is that
which has to dowith how certain ethical commitments structure our identity such
that following these commitments is necessary for maintaining this identity. As
Hampshire puts it:
18 See n. 6 for an example of this sort of instrumentalized approach to ‘sacred values’.
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“I believe that critical reflection may leave the notion of absolutely forbidden, because ab-
solutely repugnant, conduct untouched. [. . . ] [There] may be reflective reasons, in the sense
that one is able to say why the conduct is impossible as destroying the ideal of a way of life
that one aspires to and respects, as being, for example, utterly unjust or cruel or treacherous
or corruptly dishonest.” (Hampshire 1983, 90)
David Wiggins, who is also a proponent of traditional morality (or “ordinary
morality”,¹⁹ as he calls it), similarly writes: “We feel bound. But why reason-
bound? Why not say we feel bound by our moral nature, i.e., bound by those
sentiments without which (we have concluded, if we feel bound by obligation)
we should not recognize ourselves?” (Wiggins 1995, 310; cf. 2006, 135, 234–235)
Central to our “moral nature”, Wigginsmaintains, is a solidarity that is connected
to the “indefinable influence” that other human beings have upon us (recall Di-
amond’s comments above about solidarity and its connection to “the sense of
mystery surrounding our lives”).²⁰ And it is also connected with our “primitive
aversion from acts that appear as a direct assault by one personal being upon
another, acts such as murder, wounding, injury, plunder, pillage, the harming of
innocents, the repaying of good with gratuitous evil, false witness [. . . ]. [Such]
acts pass beyond the valuations bad, disappointing, [. . . ] lamentable, and trespass
onto the ground marked forbidden.” (Wiggins 2006, 246–247; cf. 11, 222)
Here we seem to be in the realm of sacred value. However, as we see, Wiggins
wants to explain the binding force (i.e., “practical necessity” or normative author-
ity) ofmoral considerations primarily in terms of our “moral nature”, i.e., in terms
of certain moral sentiments, rooted in solidarity, “without which [. . . ] we should
19 Wiggins 2006, 3–4 & ch. 9. Wiggins is a ‘genealogist’ is the mold of Hume “who is [. . . ] com-
mitted to that which he explains—prepared that is, when enough of the pieces are falling into
place, to try to vindicate most (but certainly not all) of the attitudes and convictions he seeks to
explain” (165; cf. 230–231, 236). This contrasts with the intended destructive uses of genealogy by
Nietzsche and, following him, Williams. I think Aristotle can similarly be seen as a ‘vindicatory
genealogist’. As Martha Nussbaum has discussed, Aristotle’s philosophical methodology begins
from the ‘appearances’ (phainomena), which includes taking account of what ‘themany’ and ‘the
wise’ have thought about a particular topic (e.g., ‘What is virtue?’, ‘What is happiness?’, etc.), and
then tries to ‘save’ what is true in them. Aristotle “insists that he will find his truth insidewhat we
say, see, and believe, rather than ‘far from the beaten path of human beings’ (in Plato’s words)
‘out there’” (Nussbaum 2001[1986]), 243).
20 The phrase ‘indefinable influence’ is SimoneWeil’s. She characterizes it as follows: “Anybody
who is in our vicinity exercises a certain power over us by his very presence, and a power not
exercised by him alone, that is the power of halting, repressing, modifying each movement that
our body sketches out. If we step aside for a passer-by on the road, it is not the same thing as
stepping aside to avoid a bill-board.” (quoted in Wiggins 2006, 243)
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not recognize ourselves”. Moreover, in a Humean fashion, Wiggins does not take
this to mean that we are “reason-bound”. He elaborates:
“such practical necessity can give x, who feels it, a reason, yet this can be a reason one can-
not without begging the question convert into a demonstration of someone else’s irrational-
itywhere they are unimpressed by the considerations that create for x a necessity” (Wiggins
1995, 310–311, n. 12).
Wiggins does go further elsewhere in maintaining that not only are there certain
moral sentiments, rooted in solidarity, “without which [. . . ] we should not recog-
nize ourselves”, but some of these moral sentiments are the conditions for the
possibility of any ethical life whatsoever, and hence we should expect some gen-
eral convergence on them insofar as we go in for an ethical life at all. In particular,
ourmoral sentiments regarding “the utterly forbidden” concern something the vi-
olation of which “menaces the very fabric of the ethical by threatening to destroy
the basis of the ethical in solidarity” (Wiggins 2006, 248).²¹ Wiggins contends:
“Human solidarity [. . . ] is not an ordinary human pursuit. Its role is to condition,
to civilize, and to humanize human pursuits.” (Wiggins 2008, 18) So, we might
say then that ethical theories such as utilitarianism and liberal Kantianism (i.e.,
autonomy-centered ethics) still depend upon such human solidarity for whatever
validity they possess, but they end up undermining this very human solidarity in
not giving adequate place to “the utterly forbidden”. Recall Lewis: “The rebellion
of new ideologies against the Tao is a rebellion of the branches against the tree: if
the rebels could succeed they would find that they have destroyed themselves.”
I think there is a lot that is compelling about Wiggins’s account, especially
his claim that solidarity and its connection with the utterly forbidden are the
conditions for the possibility of any viable ethical life whatsoever. However, there
are a couple of worrying features. One concerns the direction of explanation with
regard to the binding force (or normative authority) of moral considerations. Al-
though Wiggins affirms that there is an integral role played by both the subject
side and object side of our experiences of “non-instrumental” values and we can
say that certain responses (e.g., solidarity) and properties of objects (e.g., the
properties that make up a human being) are “made for one another” granted one
has a certain moral nature and acquired moral self-understanding (see Wiggins
1998[1987], 106–107, 193–194, 198–199, 207; 2006, pt. III), nevertheless, he ex-
plains the binding force of moral considerations primarily in terms of the subject
of experience rather than the object. As we have seen, it is explained in terms
of our “moral nature” and the moral sentiments “without which [. . . ] we should
21 Hampshire holds a similar view; see Hampshire 1983, 89.
Bereitgestellt von | De Gruyter / TCS
Angemeldet
Heruntergeladen am | 19.05.17 11:02
 A&K Traditional Morality and Sacred Values | 57
not recognize ourselves”. But our experience of sacred values seems to give pri-
ority to the object side in regarding things of sacred value (e.g., human beings)
as being intrinsically reverence-worthy andmaking normative demands upon us,
and there seems to be something deflationary in explaining the binding force of
sacred values or the utterly forbidden primarily in terms of the subject side.²²
The second worry, which is related to the first, concernsWiggins’s abdication
of the idea thatwe are reason-bound such thatwhat count asmoral considerations
for someone [x] “cannot without begging the question convert into a demonstra-
tion of someone else’s irrationality where they are unimpressed by the consider-
ations that create for x a necessity”. Thus, although human beings may generally
be constituted with a moral nature and educated such that they are impressed
by such consideration, if they do not happen to be so constituted and educated,
then there is nothing more to be said. There is a concession to contingency here
and with it a loss of a certain kind of moral authority that seems presupposed
in common experiences of sacred values, where, as mentioned above, we experi-
ence it as a non-contingent fact, e.g., that we ought never to kill intentionally an
innocent human being and that we ought to act with kindness rather than cru-
elty towards others. To make ethical (or practical) necessity contingent upon a
moral self-conception—where ethical commitments structure our identity and so
following these commitments is necessary for maintaining this identity—means,
as mentioned above, accepting a significantly reduced conception of normative
authority.
So what are the prospects for affirming a stronger sense of normative author-
ity of the sort that seems actually to be presupposed in our experience of sacred
values? We should consider here the work of John McDowell. He writes:
“The ethical is a domain of rational requirements, which are there in any case, whether or not
we are responsive to them.We are alerted to these demands by acquiring the appropriate con-
ceptual capacities. When a decent upbringing initiates us into the relevant way of thinking,
our eyes are opened to the very existence of this tract of the space of reasons. Thereafter our
appreciation of its detailed layout is indefinitely subject to refinement, in reflective scrutiny
of our ethical thinking.” (McDowell 1994, 82; my emphasis)
McDowell does not speak of sacred values, but instead focuses on the value of “the
noble” (which can “silence” other considerations; see McDowell 1998, 16–18, 55–
22 It shouldbe clear thatWiggins’s position is not any sort of subjectivist viewaccording towhich
value claims are either a mere expression of attitude (emotivism) or a mere projection of our psy-
chological states onto theworld (projectivism), nevertheless, he still calls it a kind of subjectivism
in that “the properties in question are explained by reference to the reactions of human subjects”
(Wiggins 1998[1987], 195).
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56, 90–93). However, on the basis of the preceding discussion of sacred values, I
think his account can and should be extended to include the ways in which “our
eyes are opened to” the demands of the sacred (i.e., the reverence-worthy), such
as through the example of saintly love or the experience and practice of solidar-
ity. Indeed, I would say that this is at the “root of the ethical” (to borrowWiggins’s
way of putting it). But, as we see here, this opening of our eyes to the demands
of the sacred requires a particular kind of ethical formation or upbringing (or Bil-
dung, as McDowell also refers to it), and this means that we must be immersed in
a particular tradition-informed moral community.
McDowell defends the idea that “immersion in a tradition might be a re-
spectable mode of access to the real” (McDowell 1994, 98), where “the real” that
is particularly at issue is a kind of ethical reality that is “there in any case, whether
or not we are responsive to [it]”. He goes on to fill out this idea of immersion in a
tradition as follows:
“[It] is not even clearly intelligible to suppose a creature might be born at home in the space
of reasons. Human beings are not: they are born mere animals, and they are transformed
into thinkers and intentional agents in the course of coming to maturity. [. . . ] In being ini-
tiated into a language, a human being is introduced into something that already embodies
putatively rational linkages between concepts, putatively constitutive of the layout of the
space of reasons, before she comes on the scene. This is a picture of the space of reasons as
an already going concern [. . . ]. [A] natural language [. . . ] serves as a repository of tradition,
a store of historically accumulated wisdom about what is a reason for what. The tradition is
subject to reflectivemodification by each generation that inherits it. Indeed, a standing obli-
gation to engage in critical reflection is itself part of the inheritance. [. . . ] But if an individual
human being is to realize her potential of taking her place in that succession, which is the
same thing as acquiring a mind, the capacity to think and act intentionally, at all, the first
thing that needs to happen is for her to be initiated into a tradition as it stands.” (125–126)
There are several important things to comment on here. First of all, this passage
makes it clear that we only achieve what is most admirable and distinctive in our
humanity through our upbringing within a particular tradition-informed cultural
life.²³ Secondly, as mentioned above, we do not begin by trying to ‘reinvent the
wheel’ in the ethical life but rather, as we see here, by being “initiated into a tra-
dition as it stands” in order to learn from “the best which has been thought and
23 Consider here the following fromEdwinMuir in his autobiography: “I think that if we examine
our lives, we will find that most good has come to us from the few loyalties, and a few discoveries
made many generations before we were born, which must always be made anew. [. . . ] As I look
back on the part of the mystery which is my own life, my own fable, what I am most aware of is
that we receive more than we can ever give; we receive it from the past, on which we draw with
every breath.” (used as an epigraph in Norris 1993)
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said” (Arnold 2006[1869], 5). We also learn from the best ethical exemplars of a
tradition, as we see in Aristotle’s appeal to the person of practical wisdom.²⁴
The kind of learning at issue here requires a significant degree of ‘docility’,
i.e., teachability, where we are dispositionally open to learning from the “store of
historically accumulated wisdom about what is a reason for what” as this comes
to us from parents and other family members, teachers, exemplars, elders, ances-
tors, and our community and its laws and customs.²⁵ But this is not the end of the
story: althoughwebegin froma certaindegree of passivity, aswe learn andmature
we become active participants in our tradition-informed cultural life—as a living
tradition—and we may come to criticize and seek to reform parts of our inherited
form of life that seem defective. Indeed, as McDowell says, “a standing obligation
to engage in critical reflection is itself part of the inheritance”. The critical test for
any such form of life is whether it can coherently be seen—by our best lights when
we are engaged within it—as best revealing our ethical demands and as best en-
abling us to live well and do well.²⁶What we cannot do is completely throw off all
tradition-informed cultural life since this provides themeans bywhich ethical de-
mands come into view in the first place and bywhichwe can live well and dowell.
Thus, when something seems defective in our tradition-informed cultural life, we
will need to make piecemeal modifications, where we seek through practical rea-
son to overcome what is problematic while also conserving what is good.²⁷
What is important to see is that there is here a possibility of a robust concep-
tion of ethical convergence. The key idea is that insofar as a particular tradition-
informed cultural life is in good order we should expect that it will converge,
within the space of reasons, upon the recognition of ethical demands (e.g., de-
mands of the sacred) that are “there in any case, whether or not we are responsive
to them”, and hence immersion in a tradition can be regarded as amode of access
to “the real”. One might question whether such a conception of ethical demands
as being “there in any case, whether or not we are responsive to them” depends
upon a teleological metaphysic according to which the universe expresses “ulti-
24 See, e.g., Nicomachean Ethics, VI.11, 1143b11–14.
25 Cf. Nicomachean Ethics, X.9, 1179b23–33; II.1, 1103b23–5; I.4, 1095b7–8.
26 Drawing on the metaphor of Neurath’s ship, which has to be rebuilt while at sea, McDowell
writes: “[One] can reflect only from the midst of the way of thinking one is reflecting about. So
if one entertains the thought that bringing one’s current ethical outlook to bear on a situation
alerts one to demands that are real, one need not be envisaging any sort of validation other than
a Neurathian one. The thought is that this application of one’s ethical outlook would stand up to
the outlook’s own reflective self-scrutiny.” (McDowell 1994, 81)
27 Recall Lewis: “Some criticism, some removal of contradictions, even some real development,
is required. [. . . ] [The] Tao admits of development from within.”
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mate moral purposes”.²⁸ Perhaps this is so, and if one is not able to affirm such a
view, then it seems that the best we can do is something like Wiggins’s account
of the moral life rooted in our moral nature. However, as I have discussed, Wig-
gins’s account seems somewhat deflationary and our experience of sacred values
seems to point us in the direction of something like McDowell’s account of ethi-
cal demands that are “there in any case”. My aim here is not to decide this issue
but rather to show what can be said in favor of traditional morality and its con-
vergence thesis. I have made the case that without proper recognition of the sort
of sacred values affirmed by traditional morality we distort the moral life and can
end up undermining it altogether, and thus we should expect that a moral life in
good order will in fact converge upon a common morality, even if there are differ-
ences in the details still to be worked out.
Acknowledgment: I thank Fiona Ellis, John Cottingham, Tom Angier, and Anton
Leist for very helpful comments on this essay.
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